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16 June 1970

MEMO FOR: Mr. Harry C. Blaney
Special Assistant to Dr. Moynihan
White House

SUBJECT : Turkey's Capability And Willingness
To Collect The 1970 Opium Crop


In response to your request of 12 June 1970,
we attach a joint BNDD/CIA evaluation. In
summary we find the Turkish government willing
to collect the entire crop and preclude diversion
into illegal channels. We believe it will have
substantial success.

JOHN W. PARKER
BNDD Working Group Member

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CIA Working Group Member

cc: 
Chairman, Working Group

DOJ Declassification/Release Decision on File

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The Size of the 1970 Crop

Production of poppy has declined in recent years, thus making it easier for the Turkish government to collect the entire crop. Legal production of poppy is that part of the crop purchased from the farmer by the Turkish government monopoly in order to meet contractual obligations for medicinal exports. The remainder of the crop goes into illicit market channels and is directed westward to Europe and North America and eastward to Iran. We believe both licit and illicit production have declined. Licit production in Turkey fell from 156 metric tons in 1967 to 115 tons in 1969. For 1970 the preliminary Turkish assessment -- made before the launching of the present program to purchase the entire crop -- indicated that 76 tons would be procured for legal export purposes.

Estimates of illicit production vary greatly -- some put it at two or three times greater than government procurement. We believe that licit and illicit production have been of an equal order of magnitude. Such an estimate is consistent with the relatively firm data on acreage and the best US judgment on the yields likely to be obtained

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by Turkish farmers given the fertility of the soil and the agricultural techniques applied. For 1970 [REDACTED] the government policy to institute preclusive buying of the illicit crop has doubled the Turkish government's monopoly purchase target from 76 to 150 tons, a figure which could fall short of the entire crop but probably not by very much. An illicit 1970 crop of 75 tons appears to make sense in view of recent trends observed in the international flows of illicit opium traffic. Increasingly it appears that the vast Iranian market has been supplied by opium smuggled from West Pakistan and Afghanistan, and possibly even from India. Demand in the illicit western markets has probably been absorbing about 60 tons of opium annually -- that is, the amount required to produce six tons of heroin.

The Program to Collect the 1970 Crop

The current program to collect the entire crop represents an unprecedented extension of Turkish governmental regulation over the production of opium. Historically the Turkish government has been reluctant to assert any authority beyond that required to meet collection requirements for legal exports. Turkey would not enter into international agreements to control opium production under UN aegis until

1961, when failure to do so would have threatened its exclusion from the legal world export market. After acceding to them, however, Ankara in fact took no steps to impose the licensing regulation of domestic production stipulated by these international control agreements.

The immediate background for the current opium collection program dates to the 1967 oral agreement between Mr. Demirel and Ambassador Hart, according to which Turkey was to phase out opium production over a three- or four-year period. The successive annual reductions in the number of opium-producing provinces followed this oral understanding. Also subsequent to the Hart-Demirel agreement, the US-Turkey Agricultural Development and Control Loan Agreement was signed, launching programs to assist farmers in crop substitution and to establish narcotics law enforcement groups within the Jandarma and the Turkish National Police.

Accomplishments directly supportive of the 1970 crop collection effort may be listed as follows:

1. [REDACTED]

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Mr. Demirel personally initiated the effort on 29 May 1970 by instructing the crop purchasing monopoly to act at once to buy up the entire crop. He will reportedly make additional funds available

as needed. He also planned, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to instruct the Ministers of Interior and Agriculture to make new efforts to control diversion.

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2. On 2 June, provincial governors were instructed by correspondence through the Ministry of Interior to cooperate with the Ministry of Agriculture, the state purchasing monopoly, the Jandarma, and the Turkish National Police in their campaign to procure the entire crop, prevent diversion to illicit markets, and suppress unauthorized production.

3. There has been improved liaison and cooperation between Turkish and Iranian border control groups resulting in increased seizures of narcotics contraband and apprehension of smugglers.

4. The suppression of production in provinces where opium cultivation has been prohibited has been successful, according to agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs working in the field with the Jandarma and Turkish National Police forces.

5. Training and equipping of the first one-third of a total of 750 men in the Jandarma and Turkish National Police narcotics law enforcement units has been completed, and these men are now in the field to reinforce the buying efforts of the Turkish government monopoly.

6. A six-man task force of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is actively participating in the field with Turkish enforcement groups charged with suppressing illicit marketing and production.

7. The intensity of enforcement efforts to control smuggling both across land borders and through ocean harbors has been stepped up.

Indications of Turkish Sincerity

The economic stake in opium production to the Turkish government is not a significant issue. Even if the current market holds up at \$15 per kilogram for raw opium, 150 tons will yield foreign exchange earnings of only \$2.25 million. However, other problems relating to political and cultural involvement with opium production have the potential of making an explosive issue of the 1970 crop collection effort. In particular, continuing political support for Demirel by the Anatolian farmers is crucial to maintaining his narrow majority.

Nevertheless, the Turkish government has been making no effort to hedge its position with excuses concerning the difficulties in controlling the crop. Further, it has invited agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to participate directly in the control program, and to date there is no indication of political interference in the

development of the control mechanisms or in the scope of their activities.

Thus the actions taken so far by Mr. Demirel and his responsible ministers directly support his word that he would buy up the crop. His instructions and his actions that follow from them will commit him to the program personally and visibly to his constituency -- supporters and enemies alike. By undertaking to collect the entire crop, a task never tried before by Turkish government organs, he takes on risks to his political fortunes that would outweigh expected gains.

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His political image at home will become hostage in part to the ability of the government monopoly to negotiate effectively and amicably with the farmers in the producing areas.

Mr. Demirel's principal gain from a successful collection effort would be a boost to his political prestige. But he must succeed completely or nearly completely if he is to avoid the displeasure and possible sanctions of the US government. On the basis of action conforming to promise and willingness

to accept risks to honor the commitment, Mr.
Demirel appears to score well on sincerity.

Crop Collection Capabilities

The question of success of Turkish government efforts to gather up the 1970 opium crop will finally be resolved by the programs directed at influencing the farmers.

The Turkish peasant is reputed to be generally honest and law abiding. Projecting US experience with regulatory programs to the situation with Turkish opium producers, we would expect about 70% of the farmers to comply with whatever laws the Turkish government decides are desirable and useful. Another 25% will cease profitable illegal activities when there is enough enforcement activity to pose a continuous threat. About 5% will violate the law if the opportunity presents itself and the profit motivation can be satisfactorily equated with the risk.

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Turkish law enforcement agencies

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usually do what they are told, one way or another. There are about 24,000 Turkish National Police and 75,000 Jandarma personnel performing law enforcement tasks. Special narcotics law enforcement groups consisting of 420 Turkish

National Police and 330 Jandarma officers are in the process of activation. Two hundred and fifty experienced officers have received special training and are now operating to suppress illicit production and smuggling of narcotics.

The Turkish agricultural monopoly which is responsible for buying up all of the opium produced is directed by a Mr. Karaelmas who, according to an estimate of the US Department of Agriculture, is the foremost agricultural civil servant in the country, is honest, and is an accomplished administrator. Further, he is [REDACTED] a long-time associate of Prime Minister Demirel, and is said to enjoy the latter's trust and confidence. On the basis of past Turkish performance with tobacco and wheat, the US Department of Agriculture also estimates that Karaelmas can carry out a successful opium collection program if he is authorized to do so. The Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and related organizations maintain intimate contact with the farmers and have personnel stationed throughout the country for the purpose of monopolizing such crops as wheat and tobacco. These personnel, already in place, can provide the needed emphasis for control of the opium crop. Agents of

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the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs working with Turkish National Police and Jandarma officers reported no evidence of illicit cultivation of poppies on the basis of surveillance that included more than three weeks of overflights of the provinces where opium production has been prohibited.

Past smuggling of Turkish opium and/or morphine base to clandestine laboratories in Europe centering in the Marseilles area has been mainly through Lebanon or from Istanbul by ship. These routes are being subjected to increased surveillance by Turkish, French, and US enforcement officers with presumable success, indicated by increasing use of land routes through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Those efforts complement the improved border security between Turkey and Iran resulting in increasing seizures of opium there. In the fall of 1969, Iran began executing narcotics smugglers and to date has shot or hanged more than 26. The Syrian border with Turkey is heavily mined and patrolled, requiring smugglers to find routes around these barriers.

Conclusions

On the basis of Demirel's instruction to Turkish officials to exercise the initiatives necessary to gather the 1970 crop and the progress to date of enforcement and agricultural programs toward this

end, we must conclude that Turkish control efforts will succeed to a substantial degree. Despite the Turkish history of non-compliance with international control efforts, Turkey has for the first time brought together the necessary elements to accomplish control. Given the continued determination on the part of the Turkish government, evidenced by implementation of control programs, diversion of Turkish opium to Iran, Western Europe, and the United States will be substantially halted. This development will force the illicit traffic into greater reliance on sources such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia.

While it is impossible to evaluate the success of this program until it is completed, we must regard the establishment of control mechanisms -- in particular of police enforcement units -- as significant progress toward permanent control of diversion to the illicit market. Thus even if some minor portion eludes control, the chances appear good to very good that most of the Turkish supply to the illicit markets of Western Europe and North America can be cut off. In that event, of course, decisive steps against illicit movement from other potential sources of supply would become the first order of business.

Implications

If the Turkish collection effort against the 1970 opium crop is successful, it can then be anticipated that Ankara will urge that continued Turkish production of opium under controlled conditions constitutes a desirable resolution of past problems. Citing the presumed success of the 1970 collection effort, Demirel could argue that Turkish production would no longer be a source for the illicit market. Production henceforth would be strictly for domestic medicinal use and legal medicinal exports. The reported statements of officials in the state crop purchasing monopoly and recent remarks of Foreign Minister Caglayangill to US officials strongly indicate bureaucratic support for this position.